C039
In their own words · Peirce 1931–1958 · CP 2.748 · quoted in Mayo 2005, p. 300 · assumed
…In describing his theory of inference, Peirce could be describing that of the error-statistician:
“The theory here proposed does not assign any probability to the inductive or hypothetic conclusion, in the sense of undertaking to say how frequently that conclusion would be found true. […] The theory here presented only says how frequently, in this universe, the special form of induction or hypothesis would lead us right.”
The probability given by this theory is in every way different - in meaning, numerical value, and form - from that of those who would apply to ampliative inference the doctrine of inverse chances.…
Probability attaches to the method’s track record, not to the hypothesis. The programme inherits the split: a validation reports how often a procedure gets it right, never how probable a given verdict is.
From the reading card: Mayo 2005, Peircean Induction and the Error-Correcting Thesis →
The five layers, for this claim
The same core in the infographic, with the claims it touches.
Relations
- ← confirms C044 If every universal theory has zero probability on any evidence, probability cannot be what separates good theories from bad ones. Popper’s zero-probability result is a reason not to assign probabilities to hypotheses.
Notation
- Claim typeWhat kind of statement it is, so that the right test can be applied. Proposed until checked by hand.
- D1.14 · metaphysical-ontological
- FunctionWhat a claim does for the programme: a conceptual tool, a working method, corrective evidence, a technical reference.
- conceptual tool
- StanceHow the programme holds the claim: assumed, used, or contested.
- assumed
- Cite this
- claudiocammarano.com/en/claims/c039/